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ABSTRACT
The microfinance industry in India experienced extraordinary evolution throughout
the 1990s and into the new century, and it is now entering a new phase of rapid expansion.
But there is still a huge gap between the demand for and supply of microfinance services in
India. With its enormous population of poor people, India is attracting increasing attention
from commercial players and government agencies, both of which are instrumental to
furthering the growth of microfinance.
This study reviews the current state of microfinance in India using the case-study
approach. Two examples were chosen as representatives of the most prevalent forms of
microfinance delivery-the Grameen model and the Self Help Group model. The two cases
also represent two diverse schools of thought that dominate the worldwide microfinance
industry: for-profit commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs) and not-for-profit NGO
MFIs.
The study discusses evolving legal structures, strategies, financing models, and
operating models used by Indian MFIs to rapidly grow their operations in order to fulfill the
huge unmet demand. It also covers the legal, financial, and operational challenges facing
MFIs, and concludes with recommendations for remedial measures and policy changes that
are required to support the urgent need to expand microfinance services in India.
Thesis Supervisor: Gabriel R. Bitran
Title: Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Professor of Management
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1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis Objective
Poor people are traditionally perceived as non-candidates for financial services.
However, by providing financial services to the poor with appropriate methods suitable to
them, the poor can begin to lift themselves out of poverty.
Microfinance has proved to be a viable tool for alleviating poverty in many parts of
the world. India has one of the largest populations of poor people in the world, and over the
past decade, microfinance has begun to attract increasing attention from many mainstream
players in India contributing to the growth of the industry.
Microfinance players in India include various microfinance institutions (MFIs), non-
government organizations (NGOs), commercial banks, government agencies, and multilateral
funding agencies. Microfinance in India is now entering a new phase of rapid expansion,
especially with the entry of mainstream players such as commercial banks, as well as
favorable governmental regulation and innovative delivery models such as Self Help Group
Bank linkage programs.
The objective of this thesis is to review the current state of microfinance in India,
using the case-study approach. Two examples were chosen as excellent representatives of the
most prevalent forms of microfinance delivery-the Grameen model and the Self Help
Group (SHG) model.
The two cases also represent two diverse schools of thought that dominate the
worldwide microfinance industry. The first one representing the new generation, for-profit,
minimalist MFIs that focuses on financial sustainability and rapid expansion; the other one is
a more traditional, not-for-profit MFI focused on development and offering microfinance as
one of several services in their broader menu of social services that includes livelihood
promotion and capacity building.
My goal is to capture some of the trends, opportunities, and challenges facing MFIs in
order to capitalize the huge opportunity that microfinance industry presents in India. I
conclude with several recommendations.
1.2 Scope
The scope of this thesis is limited to microfinance in India, although there are
occasional references to the global literature. Most of the discussion is presented in the
context of MFIs, both for-profit and not-for-profit. An analysis of the impact of microfinance
is not within the scope of this study. The information presented here is based on the author's
observations and findings during visits to India, combined with various discussions with
numerous MFI leaders, government officials, commercial bankers, and technology providers.
These interviews and discussions were conducted during January and February, 2007.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1.1.
Fig 1.1 Thesis Structure
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Chapter 2 discusses how microfinance at the worldwide level has evolved to become
a viable tool for alleviating global poverty.
Chapter 3 reviews the current status of microfinance in India, focusing on growth
factors and successful delivery models and strategies that have evolved over the past three
decades.
Chapter 4 is a case study of SKS Micro Finance Pvt. Ltd (SKS), a for-profit,
minimalist MFI. The case study presents details of the organizational structure of SKS and
strategies it uses to accelerate growth. A detailed review of SKS operations is also provided.
Chapter 5 is a case study of Ankuram Sangamam Poram (ASP), a non-profit NGO.
The case study focuses on the structure, strategies, and operations, especially highlighting the
cooperative nature of this NGO organization and the operational differences that result
compared with SKS.
Chapter 6 discusses key trends, opportunities, and challenges that Indian MFIs are
experiencing as the entire industry enters a new phase of rapid growth.
Chapter 7 offers a concluding summary and my observations and recommendations.
CHAPTER
2
Microfinance and Poverty
2.1 Introduction
One definition of"microfinance" is the methods and processes used to provide
financial services to low-income people, including credit, savings, insurance, and remittances.
Microfinance is a fast-growing, highly recognized tool for alleviating poverty, and it has
become an integral strategy for developing countries. The institutions and organizations that
offer these services are called microfinance institutions (MFIs).
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as NGOs and various types of cooperatives began
to offer financial services to low-income people-those who are traditionally considered not
viable customers for the typical range of banking services because they lack collateral. By
providing credit rather than grants, MFI providers become sustainable by circulating
available resources, thus helping MFIs to reach out to many more low-income households.
Considerable academic and professional research has been done on the topic of microfinance
and its impact on the development process (see, for example, Fisher and Sriram, 2002; Tsai,
2004; and Dasgupta, 2005).
2.2 Microfinance: A Tool for Alleviating Global Poverty
In 2006, the Nobel Peace Prize went to Professor Yunus Muhammad, the pioneering
founder of the microfinance movement, and the United Nations declared 2005 the year of
microfinance. Each is testament to the fact that microfinance has had a positive impact on the
lives of poor people. According to Jonathan Morduch, Chairman of the United Nations
Expert Group on Poverty Statistics, "Microfinance stands as one of the most promising and
cost-effective tools in the fight against global poverty."' There is no doubt that microfinance
has become a major tool for alleviating poverty in developing economies.
Half of the world's population-three billion people--live on less than $2 per day,
and they are unable to achieve minimum basic living conditions. Such abject poverty means
this large segment of the population suffers from malnutrition, lack of health care,
substandard housing, and illiteracy. Poverty is trapping future generations in a vicious cycle
without hope or opportunity.
With small so-called "micro loans" (amounts less than $100) used to generate income
by investing in a new or existing business, the poor are able to improve their economic
condition and begin to work their way out of poverty. It is well documented that when low-
income people have access to affordable capital, they are capable of utilizing their
entrepreneurial skills to earn a living and support their families; some have even become
highly successful business owners.
Contrary to traditional thinking, recipients of microfinance have demonstrated a high
loan repayment rate, which shows that many poor people are indeed bankable and capable of
transforming their lives if given affordable credit. Such lending disproves all conventional
'Micro Credit Summit Campaign Report, 2005.
thinking about lending to the poor, and proves that microfinance can be one of the most
sustainable and effective tools in the fight against global poverty.
A study of three Bangladeshi MFIs showed that a 40% reduction in moderate poverty
in rural Bangladesh could be attributed to microfinance (Khandker, 2005). The study further
proved that the spill-over effects of microfinance on non-participants was also positive.
Microfinance enables low-income people to experience upward economic mobility and, more
important, helps them move from survival mode to planning mode.
Traditional banking processes and systems have proved ineffective in providing
universal access to credit. There are many economic, infrastructural, and last-mile issues that
prohibit traditional banks from reaching out to the poor. The fundamental reason why
commercial banks do not provide loans to low-income people is because they do not have
sufficient assets that can be used as collateral or guarantee. Microfinance institutions came
into existence to bridge this gap by offering collateral-free loans.
Microfinance first started in the 1970s and enjoyed early successes in Bangladesh and
Bolivia. In India, SEWA bank was an early pioneer in providing financial services to low-
income people in the 1970s. For the past 30 years, the worldwide microfinance industry has
evolved through innovation and experimentation to become a major industry with its own
trade associations, annual conferences, professional groups and online resources dedicated to
microfinance. Several proven best practices and methodologies have evolved through the
years and they continue to be replicated and adapted to suit local needs.
According to the Microcredit Summit Report 2006, it is estimated that 3,133
microfinance institutions worldwide report that 113 million people are receiving the benefits
of microfinance. Among these 113 million of people, almost 82 million were the poorest at
the time of their first loan. Of these poorest clients, more than 84% are women. Assuming
five persons per family, 82 million poor clients reached by the end of 2005 have in fact
affected some 410 million family members. Table 2.1 shows the growth of MFIs and the
total number of clients during the past decade. The number of clients reached grew at an
average rate of just over 34%.
Table 2.1 Growth of MFIs and Number of Clients, 1997-2005
Number of Programs Total Number of Number of poorest
Year Reporting clients reached clients reported
--12/31/98 925 institutions 20,938,899 12,221,918
12/31/00 1,567 institutions 30,681,107 19327,451
12/31/02 2,572 institutions 67,606,080 41,594,778
12/31/04 3,164 institutions 92,270,289 66,614,871
iAWM s 3,133 kwblu s'i 11ir3 *A1*M
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, 2006.
Figure 2.1 shows the number of families living in poverty in various regions of the
world (i.e., those living on less than $1/day adjusted for purchasing power parity) and the
number of poor families utilizing microfinance in each region, at the end of 2005. Asia has
the highest percentage of poor people, amounting to 157.8 million families; it also has the
highest MFI coverage ratio of 47.1%. Africa follows with 61.5 million poor families but only
9.4% of MFI coverage. Latin America and Europe have 12.1 and 3.5 million poor families,
respectively, with 1.8% and 0.08% of MFI coverage, respectively.
Fig. 2.1 Regional Breakdown of Access to Microfinance
Asia Africa & Middle East LA & Carib Europe & NIS
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, 2006.
Clearly, microfinance is a powerful tool in the battle to alleviate poverty worldwide.
In most developing countries, microfinance is embraced by local governments, multilateral
agencies, and for-profit and non-profit MFIs. There remains, however, a large variation in the
level of outreach and quality of microfinance services available among different countries of
the world.
CHAPTER
3
Poverty and Microfinance in India
3.1 Poverty in India
India is home to more than 1.1 billion people and, according to UNDP statistics, 34%
of the Indian population lives below the poverty line. This means 374 million people live on
less than $1 a day and do not consume more than 2,100 calories a day. In addition, 80% of
India's total population (880 million or 150 million households) lives on less than $2 a day
(UNDP, 2006).
Although the population continually migrates from rural areas to urban areas, 70% of
India's population still lives in rural areas. Lack of access to financial resources and few (or
no) productive assets are the major causes of poverty among rural Indian people. High levels
of illiteracy, poor health care coverage, and limited access to social services are common
among the rural population.
In addition, the long-established hierarchical caste system is still very much intact in
India's rural society. This system excludes the lower-caste population known as dalits and
the "most backward classes" (also known as MBCs) from mainstream economic activities,
which leaves them in destitution. Most are marginal farmers, landless laborers, and artisans
who do not own any productive assets. Dalits constitute 25% of India's population, and 80%
of them are very poor and considered the most disadvantaged section of India's population.
Depending on the social group they belong to, rural women in general are also among
the most disadvantaged people in Indian society. Thus, dalit women are double victims-
suffering both caste and gender bias-and they are the most vulnerable of all.
Despite the fact that the Indian economy has experienced impressive growth rates of
6% to 8% over the past 15 years-due in large part to the massive liberalization of economic
policies in 1991-opportunities for the unskilled and the illiterate are not increasing fast
enough compared to opportunities for the highly skilled labor, thus creating a lopsided
growth in the economy and further worsening the gap between the rich and poor. The current
economic expansion is primarily confined to the major urban areas, so the economic
condition of the rural population remains unchanged. New job opportunities are created in
the highly skilled service sectors, such as information technology, business process
outsourcing, and research and development, but again, these jobs are mostly confined to
urban areas, which prevent rural people from accessing even indirect employment.
3.2 Microfinance Demand and Supply
"The annual credit demand by the poor in India is huge. The supply ofmicrofinance
services is growing but needs exponential growth to come anywhere close to meeting the
demand" (Sa-Dhan, 2006).
In the past decade, both the number of MFIs and the outreach of microfinance have
grown rapidly, but there is still a huge gap between the demand for and supply of financial
services for low-income Indian people. Assuming the average demand for credit per
household to be $500 (Rs 21,0001), the total potential demand for credit is estimated at $75
billion. Many studies show that extending credit to the poor on reasonable terms can produce
' Exchange rate used throughout this thesis is Rs. 42 = US$1.
a significant reduction in poverty. However, in spite of the large network of commercial
banks and cooperative banks in India, none are especially successful at serving the financial
needs of the poor. The "All India Debt and Investment Survey" (1991) conducted by the
Reserve Bank of India concluded that although institutional credit to rural households has
increased steadily. However, people with low income continue to depend on non-institutional
credit, typically from money lenders who charge exorbitant interest rates. The survey showed
that total credit use from formal sources increased from 29.2% in 1971 to 56.6% in 1991,
compared to credit from informal sources, which decreased from 70.8% in 1971 to 39.6% in
1991(Fisher & Sriram, 2002). One can conclude that although there is an increase in use of
credit from formal sources, a sizable rural population and mostly low-income households
continue to depend on the informal sources for their credit needs.
3.3 The Growth of Microfinance
Although the Indian government has long supported banking, bank penetration to the
rural poor is very limited. The single most important reason for this lack of penetration is
overall unfavorable banking policies. But a major breakthrough occurred when government
policies were liberalized, which included support for lending to self-help groups-typically
15-20 members who form a cooperative and act as a joint liability group.
India has a well-established formal banking sector with a wide network of branches.
However, the majority of the population is not served by the formal banking sector for
various economic, legal, and infrastructure reasons. Lack of collateral and reaching the last
mile in rural areas are the two most significant issues. Until economic reforms in 1991, the
Indian government banking policy was highly regulated. After 1991, the government made
poverty alleviation a priority and expanded the banking network into rural areas. Banks were
compelled to lend to people in the lower-income levels, thereby increasing the supply of
credit to rural people. However, regulated and highly subsidized interest rates have caused
high default rates-on the order of 400/%--making lending to the rural poor not sustainable.
In 2004, a task force studying the revival of cooperative credit institutions (Task
Force, 2004) concluded that the systems and procedures of India's traditional banking system,
which were primarily designed for business and industrial financing in urban areas, had
serious limitations, especially concerning the need to reach the last mile when dealing with
the rural poor. One fundamental issue highlighted in the report was that banks offer credit
based on collateral rather than on trust. Lack of collateral assets is a fundamental problem for
the poor.
In 1991, the Indian government embarked on a massive campaign to liberalize the
nation's economy. The government initiated a series of financial-sector reform policies that
helped commercial banks expand into new markets based on their viability rather than
directed by government policy. Successive new policy initiatives from the central
government and state governments created a conducive atmosphere for the growth of
microfinance and rural credit supply in India. Some of the key policy changes that helped
the microfinance credit supply and the overall industry are:
* In 1996, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) deregulated interest rates for small loans (defined
as those below Rs 200,000) made by cooperative and regional rural banks.
* In 2000, RBI declared that lending to MFIs would be a top priority.
* In 1995, the government of Andhra Pradesh state-a pioneer in the cooperative
movement when it passed the Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies (MACS) Act-
granted autonomy to the cooperatives. Soon several other states passed similar laws.
* In 1998, the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) set up its Foundation
for Micro-Credit, with initial capitalization of Rs 1000 million.
Reserve Bank of India data shows that over the last decade, the banks' outreach to
small borrowers (defined as those seeking less than Rs. 25,000) has progressively declined,
both as a proportion of credit and in terms of total bank accounts. Making financial services
accessible to the rural poor required a new and innovative ways to operate compared to
traditional banking processes. Microfinance institutions have thus emerged as key providers
of financial services for low-income families.
Modem forms of microfinance have only recently arrived in India, despite several
successful microfinance programs in Bangladesh and Latin America. And microfinance
activity in India has taken off during the past decade, and is currently at an inflection point.
The supply of microfinance services is growing rapidly but the gap between demand and
supply is still very large. According to several microfinance practitioners the current outreach
is estimated to be $4.8 billion versus total demand of $75 billion. Therefore, there is a huge
unmet demand for credit, which presents an attractive market opportunity for MFIs and
investors.
Building on the early successes of the Self Help Group (SHG) movement, the
government-owned National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)
aggressively supported the expansion of the SHG movement. High repayment rates and the
proven positive economic impact of SHGs were key success factors, creating a virtuous cycle
of increasing enthusiasm among bankers and government agencies. Today, the SHG
movement in India consists of 1.4 million groups with 20 million members (Arora 2005), and
the movement is largely responsible for increasing the supply of microfinance services in
India.
Figure 3.1 shows the growth pattern of Sa-Dhan (Industry Association of Community
Development Finance Institutions in India). All major MFIs in India are members of this
organization. Sa-Dhan membership and their combined outreach are good indicators of the
growth of the microfinance industry in India. Sa-Dhan membership grew at an impressive
rate of 250% between 2001 and 2006; during the same period, the combined outreach of their
member MFIs and the gross loan portfolio experienced phenomenal growth of 2,791% and
3,110%, respectively.
Fig. 3.1 Growth of Sa-Dhan Member MFIs and Their Outreach
2001 2002 2003
Year
2004
Sou Nrce: of Member Side-by-Si Outrech in 'Slices of Loan Outstanding (Rs.Operaton)ion, 2006.
Source: Side-by-Side, A Slice of Microfinance Operation, 2006.
AS.
2005 2006
3.4 Indian Microfinance Models
Most of the MFIs in India originally began as NGOs that offered microfinance as an
additional service. Today, over 1,000 NGOs and MFIs work in the microfinance sector in
India (Sinha & Patole, 2002). During the last decade there has been tremendous growth in the
number of MFIs in India, and most of the new ones are commercial microfinance institutions
that are quite minimalist in their approach. Minimalist MFIs are those that focus on providing
financial services to the poor in a financially sustainable way, and these MFIs typically do
not offer non-financial services such as capacity building, livelihood promotion, or technical
and marketing support. Most of the new generation of MFIs in India are minimalist MFIs.
There are different models of microfinance institutions operating in India. Most
involve different agencies; commercial banks, NGOs, and local and federal governments.
The most common practice is group lending, in which MFIs work with organized groups, and
these groups act as intermediaries to conduct financial transactions with individuals. Only a
small percentage of them deal directly with individuals. The most important aspect of these
groups is the assumption of joint liability for loans taken by clients.
The two most common models are Self Help Groups (SHGs) and the Grameen Model.
The core concept behind both types is similar, but they differ in several operational aspects.
3.4.1 Self-Help Groups
Self Help Groups typically consist of 15-20 people, 90% of whom are women who
belong to the same village. Addressing the issue of why most members are women,
Mohammed Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank told United States Congressional Forum,
"Women have plans for themselves, for their children, about their home, the meals. They
have a vision. A man wants to enjoy himself' (Katherine and Richey, 2003). When finances
are made available to women, it is fairly certain that surplus money will be put back into
improving the household income.
The average size of SHGs in India is about 17. These groups are typically organized
and promoted by NGOs, government agencies, and commercial banks. In India, SHGs are
the best established and most predominant model, accounting for 70% of microfinance in
India. SHGs are managed by the members themselves, although NGOs or government
agencies usually provide training and capacity-building services until they are self sufficient
and able to operate the group.
An important aspect of SHGs is their focus on regular savings by group members.
SHGs typically pool their savings on a regular basis and then use the funds for loans to
individuals in need. Interest rates are set by the groups themselves and administration-
including disbursement, collection, and bookkeeping-is all done by group members.
Individual groups may organize into federations in order to exchange funds between
individual groups that have a demonstrated need. An SHG in need of additional funds may
borrow from an SHG that has surplus funds, based on mutually agreed repayment terms.
SHGs open saving accounts in the group's name with an MFI or bank and deposit
excess funds after required loans are distributed among group members. These deposits help
the group qualify for a bank loan. As a registered group, SHGs can borrow money from a
bank, and that money is used by the group to supplement its own funds for lending to
members of the group.
Commercial banks that lend directly to SHGs have experienced tremendous growth,
especially following a highly successful SHG-bank linkage program pioneered by NABARD
in 1992. In this model, MFIs act as a facilitator and intermediary between the commercial
banks and the SHGs. In some cases, MFIs also act as a financial intermediary between the
banks and SHGs, carrying the loan portfolio on their balance sheet.
According to NABARD, by end of the March 2006, 22.38 million SHGs (on a
cumulative basis) have been active borrowers of the banking system covering more than
32.98 million households. NABARD, with its special emphasis on 13 priority states, has
credit links with more than million SHGs in these states, which account for 45% of the total
number of SHGs in India.
The number of SHGs has grown rapidly over the past 10 to 15 years, with an average
annual growth rate of 82%. Having achieved its initial target of reaching 1 million SHGs in
2004 three years ahead of its target date, NABARD has set a target of connecting 2 million
SHGs by 2008 covering 140 million house holds (Kumar 2005). The SHG-bank linkage
program pioneered by NABARD had a huge impact on expansion in the microfinance sector
in India. The total loan amount disbursed through these groups has an average annual growth
rate of 110% (Fouillet & Augsburg 2007).
3.4.2 Grameen Model
The Grameen Model is a replication of a successful microfinance delivery model
developed by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In this model, loans and other financial services
are provided to village groups that have five or more members. Like the SHG model, the
Grameen model works mostly with women. More than 20 MFIs in India use the Grameen
model with minor variations to suit their local conditions. SKS and SHARE are two leading
MFIs in India, both of which use the Grameen model.
Here is how it works. First, groups of five prospective borrowers are formed into a
Joint Liability Group. Credit provisioning begins with a loan to only two of the five members
in the group, and group leaders decide which member will receive the loan. Repayments are
collected weekly by MFI field staff in village center meetings. Repayment in small amounts
at weekly intervals has proved to be effective for achieving high repayment rates. In addition,
the social pressure of other members who attend the weekly center meetings acts as social
collateral, ensuring almost 100% repayments. The collective responsibility of the group
serves as collateral for the loan and in case a borrower does not repay a loan, the other group
members are responsible for repayment. Sometimes these groups of 5 are federated into a
center, each comprised of about 20 members, and the centers may be further federated into
branches.
The Grameen Model requires a dedicated, special-purpose organization and weekly
visits by MFI staff to the centers. Most of the operations and bookkeeping are done by the
MFI staff, including decisions on setting the terms of loans-in contrast to SHGs where the
members do most of their own administration and bookkeeping. The different operating
features of SHG and Grameen models are provided in the Appendix.
In Chapters 4 and 5, two case studies are presented, which compare and contrast the
two models discussed here. The cases represent differing schools of thoughts that have
evolved in the microfinance industry in India: (1) traditional non-profit NGOs delivering
microfinance services as part of their larger development focus, and (2) a new generation of
for-profit MFIs focused on financial sustainability and accelerated growth in order to expand
the outreach.
CHAPTER
4
Case Study: SKS Microfinance Pvt. Ltd.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a case study of SKS Micro Finance Pvt. Ltd (SKS). SKS is
a for-profit MFI and uses the Grameen model. Information about SKS was obtained from
discussions with its founder and CEO, Vikram Akula, in India and at MIT. I also visited
SKS headquarters in Hyderabad in January 2007 and interviewed a few members of the
SKS staff.
4.2 Overview of SKS
SKS is one of a new generation of MFIs, and one of the fastest-growing MFIs in
the world, experiencing a 165% growth rate in 2006. As of April 30, 2007, SKS serves
632,000 clients in 11 Indian states and has an outstanding loan portfolio of $68 million
(SKS website). SKS has 304 branch offices and nearly 2,000 employees, and it is
currently growing at a rate of 30 branches per month and 60,000 new clients per month.
SKS has disbursed more than $155 million since it started operations in 1998. It enjoys
an extraordinary on-time repayment rate of 99%. SKS uses a version of the Grameen
model.
SKS was founded in 1998 by Vikram Akula, in the Telangana region of Andhra
Pradesh state in southern India. Its initial operations focused on rural areas of Telangana,
one of the poorest regions of India. Telangana's rural population depends primarily on
agriculture and related economic activities; the population is largely landless laborers and
marginal farmers. Telangana is continually drought-prone, and has limited irrigation
facilities, which is a major cause of economic backwardness, subjecting half of its
population to abject poverty (Rao, 2003).
When it started in 1998 it was a non-profit organization, but it converted to a for-
profit Non Banking Finance Company (NBFC) in January 2005. NBFCs are for-profit
financial organizations regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). NBFCs raise their
capital investment from commercial investors and global capital markets in the form of
equity and debt. Since the transformation of SKS into an NBFC, it has successfully
attracted capital for its first round of equity investment from well-known people and
institutions such as Vinod Khosla, Unitus, and SIDBI. The equity ownership of SKS as of
February 2007 is shown in Figure 4.1. SKS converted the grant money it received prior to
becoming an NBFC into equity ownership by its clients and borrowers.
Fig. 4.1 Ownership Structure of SKS
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NOTE: The ownership structure shown here is prior to the second round of equity investment, which
brought $11.5m and was led by Sequoia Capital on March 29, 2007. Other investors in this round included
Unitus Equity Fund, Vinod Khosla, Ravi Reddy, and Odyssey Capital.
Source: Akula, 2007.
Leveraging the external equity investment of $3.2 million, SKS raised more than
$45 million in debt from commercial banks in India and abroad. SKS's high leverage
ratio (more than 14) indicates a typical MFI that is trying to leverage its limited equity to
raise debt for lending. Figure 4.2 shows the composition of external debt borrowed from
various banks and financial institutions. It is interesting that Citibank provided its first
MFI loan in India to SKS, and HSBC provided its first-ever MFI loan to SKS. The funds
borrowed from ICICI Bank are through its partnership model. In the partnership model,
MFIs do not own the loan portfolio, so in this case SKS does not own the loan but acts as
a service provider while the loan shows up on ICICI's balance sheet.
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4.3 SKS Strategy
SKS's strategy is to offer financial services to the poor in a financially sustainable
way so SKS can scale its operations and reach millions of non-bankable poor people in
India. SKS's strategy is based on three principles:
1. Profit-oriented model
2. Standardized and scalable best practices
3. Technology that automates operations.
In the following sections, these three strategies are discussed in detail.
23% SIDBI
I HDFC BAN
HI UT B
4.3.1 Profit-Oriented Model
Recognizing that traditional methods of microfinance are difficult to scale due to
their over-dependence on grant money, SKS offers its financial services to the poor in a
financially sustainable way that earns profit while creating social good. This is a key
point when accessing funds from commercial institutions. As discussed in Section 3.2, in
India alone, the total demand for credit by the poor is estimated to be $75 billion, yet the
current supply of micro lending is less than $5 billion-clearly, a huge gap between
demand and supply. The only practical way to bridge this gap is by channeling funds
from global capital markets in the form of equity investments and debt.
As part of its strategy, SKS transformed itself into a for-profit NBFC regulated by
RBI. This for-profit status increases the comfort level of commercial banks and other
financial institutions that might consider lending money to SKS, making them more
willing to take higher risks and more comfortable about increasing their funding to SKS.
NBFC status also enables SKS to raise equity investments not only from traditional banks
but also from venture capital and private equity firms. Equity investors can have
ownership in the firm and receive returns in the form of dividends from retained earnings.
Equity capital is essential for raising debt, but often it is a major constraint for MFIs in
general and especially for NGOs.
4.3.2 Standardized and Scalable Best Practices
SKS deploys standard, scalable best practices in order to reduce costs and quickly
scale its operations. It uses the Grameen model lending methodology to mitigate risk. It
also identifies relevant, well-defined best practices and replicates them repeatedly,
applying them to customers facing processes such as village selection, center formation,
and financial transactions, and to non-customers facing processes such as branch office
operations and recruitment and training of employees. Further detailed description of
some of the best practices of SKS will be reviewed below in Section 4.4.
4.3.3 Using Technology to Automate Operations
SKS is a pioneer in using technology to automate its microfinance operations. As
early as 2002, SKS was using smart cards to automate its field transactions. Its
Management Information System (MIS) is developed in-house to automate transactions
at the branch level as well as back-end operations and management reporting. This
includes a portfolio tracker, an accounting module, and management reporting.
All the transactions conducted in local villages are entered in the MIS system at
the branch office. This information is immediately passed to headquarters servers
wherever Internet connectivity exists. If no Internet access is available, the branch office
transactions data is burned to a CD every week and sent to headquarters for consolidation.
The MIS system improves the efficiency of branch office operations by eliminating
manual recording and tracking of transactions. The increased visibility and timely update
of portfolio information helps senior management respond to potential problems in a
timely manner.
At headquarters, the data is consolidated into one database for generating
summary reports for management. Several reports that monitor performance are also used
to support management decision making. In addition, several ad hoc reports are
continually generated by the internal IT department to support the unique requirements of
the funding agencies. SKS has a strong internal IT department staffed by 33 people: 8 are
at headquarters and rest are located at branch offices.
4.4 Operations
SKS operates in a hub-and-spoke model that mandates a branch office for every
20 to 30 villages. A typical branch office is staffed by 6 to 10 loan officers (Kumar,
2007). Each branch office is equipped with a computer and the Portfolio Tracker
application system. Riding on motorbikes, the loan officers go to the villages every week
to deliver the financial services.
A typical MFI operation can be classified into customer-facing field operations
and non-customer-facing, back-office operations. SKS customer-facing operations
include (1) village selection, (2) center formation, and (3) financial transactions. Non-
customer-facing operations include branch office operations.
4.4.1 Village Selection
When SKS targets a new village, the branch office staff goes to the village and
conducts a survey to better understand local economic activity and the level of poverty in
the village. The staff also assesses the political stability of the village and determines its
accessibility via road. Once a decision is made to begin operations in the village, a
projection meeting is conducted where the staff introduce the SKS organization and its
philosophy regarding micro loans to the villagers. As a follow-up, SKS staff also conduct
sessions with individuals and smaller groups on an as-needed basis.
4.4.2 Center Formation
Once the village is selected, the next step is to form joint liability groups (JLG) of
five members each. Like many microfinance institutions, SKS deals exclusively with
women. The group members are usually known to each other and should be comfortable
acting as guarantors for each other. This is the core concept of the Grameen model, where
the group acts as collateral for individual loans and if any one of them defaults, the rest of
the group members are responsible for paying off the loan.
A number of JLGs are grouped into what is called a Center for each village. A
typical center may consist of 4 to 12 JLGs, and each village may have one or more
centers. The center acts as another layer of joint liability for individuals and for the JLGs.
Group members in the center go through compulsory training on the SKS group lending
methodology before they can start conducting transactions.
4.4.3 Financial Transactions
SKS field assistants and loan officers visit each center every week. There they
facilitate center meetings, where the weekly financial transactions, collections, and new
loan disbursements are completed. Transactions are recorded on paper. In the past, SKS
tried to automate the field transactions using the smartcards, but could not go further with
the technology owing to regulatory issues and financial viability. Thus, it is a very labor-
intensive and high-cost proposition to meet every customer, every week, at their doorstep.
However, the Grameen model has found that weekly collection process is a best practice
with the rural poor, who are more comfortable paying small amounts more frequently
rather than larger amounts over longer periods. Dealing with large volumes of smaller
payments is one reason for the high operating costs of MFIs, which ultimately results in
higher interest rates for the end clients.
4.4.4 Branch Office Operation
Before the field assistants go to the village centers, they take a print-out from the
MIS system that lists all the collections and loan disbursements for the day. At the end of
the day the field assistant returns to the branch office and enters all the day's transactions
in the Portfolio Tracker, which takes 15-20 minutes. The new information is sent back to
headquarters daily via the Internet (where there is connectivity), or weekly by CD (if
there is no Internet connectivity).
4.5 Products
SKS currently offers various micro loans and micro insurance products. SKS
previously offered savings product as well, but had to stop when SKS was transformed
into an NBFC. RBI rules are not favorable for NBFCs wishing to offer savings products.
Table 4.1 lists products currently offered by SKS. The majority of loans are
offered to meet the working capital needs of small enterprises and are for income-
generation purposes only. These include income-generating loans (IGL), mid-term loans
(MTL), and individual loans. Both IGLs and MTLs are offered through the group lending
model, whereas individual loans are offered outside the group lending model. Individual
loans are relatively a new product offered by SKS and are offered to those who have
moved out of subsistence levels. The loan is offered following a thorough due diligence
of the individual's business and a personal guarantee. Interest-free emergency loans are
also offered to SKS clients to cope with extreme financial situations, such as
hospitalization and/or death. Repayment terms for such loans are determined on a case-
by-case basis.
SKS offers insurance products to cover all loans provided to clients. Coverage is
for the entire term of the loan and covers both principal and interest. Insurance is offered
to all SKS clients and costs 1% of the total loan amount. The plan covers the life of the
member and his/her spouse. This product is offered through collaboration with the Life
Insurance Corporation of India. SKS covers almost 1.2 million people with its insurance
product.
Table 4.1 SKS Product Offerings
Type of Product Purpose Terms Interest Rate
(Effective)
Income Small Enterprise Starting at Rs 10,000 ($230) 25-30%*
Generating Loans 50 weekly repayments
Mid-Term Loans Small Enterprise Starting at Rs 10,000 ($230) 25-30%
50 weekly repayments
Individual Loans Small Enterprise Starting at Rs 20,000 ($460) 23%
Emergency Loans Emergencies 20 weeks bullet repayment 0%
Insurance Loan Cover Insurance 1% of loan amount NA
for member and husband
* The prime lending rate for Indian banks is around 13%. That rate is a good benchmark for consumer
loans.
Sources: Akula, 2007; Ramalingam, 2007.
CHAPTER
5
Case Study: Ankuram Sangamam Poram
5.1 Introduction
Ankuram Sangamam Poram (ASP) is a non-profit NGO focused solely on
dalitbahujans, who are the lowest strata in the Indian caste system and constitute 80% of
India's population. The overwhelming percentage of dalitbahujans in India are poor or very
poor.
I visited ASP in January and interviewed Jyothi Neelaiah, CEO of ASP and H.
Dayanand, General Manager of ASP. The information in this case study is based on their
interviews, information available at the ASP website, and several e-mail exchanges and
telephone conversations I had with Neelaiah.
ASP is a multi-faceted NGO organization involved in livelihood promotion, capacity
building, and microfinance. In this study, I focus mainly on its microfinance operations in an
effort to compare and contrast ASP with commercial MFI entities such as SKS.
5.2 Overview of ASP
ASP is a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by J. Neelaiah by bringing together
165 cooperative societies, and it is based on the SHG model. ASP's primary focus is
empowering the dalitbahujans, mostly in rural areas, by providing credit, livelihood training,
and support for their capacity-building activities. Microfinance is one of the services ASP
provides, which is an integral part of its overall strategy to economically uplift the
dalitbahujans.
ASP has 80,000 members spread over 1,500 villages in 85 mandals (a mandal is a
local government unit consisting of 15-20 villages) in the state of Andhra Pradesh in south
India. ASP focuses on savings and has so far accumulated savings worth Rs 12 crores ($2.8
million). It also has loans outstanding of Rs 20 crores ($4.65 million) with a repayment
history of 90-95%. According to Neelaiah, the client base is growing at a rate of 20% per
year. ASP has a total of 310 employees of which 55 are located at the headquarters in
Hyderabad and the rest are located at the mandal offices. Each mandal office has an average
of three employees.
ASP is registered as a Mutually Aided Cooperative Society (MACS) in Andhra
Pradesh and with its 165 cooperative societies it formed a group of several village-level
SHGs. The general body of ASP is made up of all the presidents of the mandal-level MACS,
who elect a board of directors from the general body. The organization structure of ASP is
shown in Figure 5.1 below.
Fig. 5.1 Organization Structure of ASP
Source: www.ankuram.com/structure.htm
5.3 Strategy
J. Neelaiah, ASP's founder, stated the firm's strategy as the following:
The primary strategy is mobilization of the dalitbahujans, especially women;
their organization as a network of independent and inter-dependent cooperative
micro-finance organizations, and their capacitation for self-managed delivery of
a wide range of sustainable micro-finance and livelihood services.
ASP has a three-pronged strategy to achieve its objectives:
* Focus on the poorest dalitbahujan women
* Use an institutional approach at each level of the organization, i.e., SHG, Mandal-
level MACS, and the ASP federation. Client owned, operated, and used community
organizations.
* Deliver a range of financial services such as savings, credit, insurance and non-
financial services such as capacity development and livelihood promotion.
5.4 Operations
ASP operates as a three-tier, hierarchical model: ASP, Mandal-level MACS, and the
SHGs-and it also has three primary operating themes: Ankuram, Sangamam and Poram.
* Ankuram means "a tender shoot." This theme focuses on the livelihood and small-
enterprise activities in the farm and non-farm sectors where women and men can
become members.
* Sangamam means 'meeting point." This theme focuses on microfinance and offers
savings and credit activities exclusively for dalitbahujan women.
* Poram means "anvil." This theme focuses on the leather artisans, helping to improve
their economic activity by training and market linkages.
In this thesis, I focus on the Sangamam aspect, which offers microfinance services to
the poor. These services can best be described by discussing activities in the three tiers of the
ASP organization, i.e., at the ASP, Mandal-level MACS, and SHG levels.
5.4.1 Self Help Groups
At village level, an SHG is typically formed with 15 to 20 members, with one or
more SHGs per village. SHGs are self-managed groups that elect two members as leaders to
represent their SHGs in the mandal-level MACS. Leaders also conduct bi-weekly meetings,
administer financial transactions, and manually record them in the books. Leadership is
rotated among the members every year. SHG members abide by certain group norms such as
mandatory attendance at bi-weekly meetings and compulsory savings every month.
The most important aspect of the SHGs is pooling the members' savings and rotating
the money within the group to meet individual needs. Therefore, each member of the SHG
must agree to compulsory savings of Rs.30 ($0.7) per month. Additional savings above and
beyond the prescribed minimum is encouraged. The pooled money is distributed as small
loans to members in need of credit for small enterprises and for various consumption needs.
Loans larger than Rs.6,000 ($140) are obtained from the parent MACs.
5.4.2 Mandal-level MACS
A Mutually Aided Cooperative is a legal entity under the Mutually Aided
Cooperatives Societies (MACS) Act of 1995 in Andhra Pradesh state. Within the ASP
structure, each mandal has one registered MACS, and all SHG members within that mandal
become members. The general body of the MACS is represented by two leaders from each
SHG, who in turn elect 11 to 15 board of directors; the general body also elects a president.
One-third of the board of directors retires every year, making room for new leadership. The
board of directors meets once a month.
Each MACS is staffed by three full-time professional employees who guide the
MACS leadership and supervise the SHGs. With its legal status, MACS acts as an
intermediary to access external credit and other non-financial services for its members and as
links to government agencies and development programs. The key success of the MACS lies
in its financially self-sufficient operations. MACS receive a 4% commission on the lending it
provides to SHGs. The costs for accessing credit are totally borne by MACS, although the
parent federation provides partial support for non-financial services undertaken by the
MACS.
5.4.3 ASP Federation
The ASP federation itself is registered as a MACS under the Andhra Pradesh State
MACS Act. It functions as a federation of all mandal-level MACS. The ASP federation's
general body is made up of presidents of mandal-level MACS who elect a board of directors
from the general body.
ASP headquarters is staffed by 55 people, most of whom are computer literate. The
primary function of the federation is to develop the processes and systems for operating the
individual MACS and SHGs. The federation also develops various savings, credit, and
insurance products, as well as the operating processes used by the MACS. The federation
maintains relationships with various financial institutions and commercial banks and raises
credit on an as-needed basis.
ASP has raised credit with financial institutions such as ICICI, Basix, and UTI. The
current external borrowings of the ASP federation are around Rs. 8 crores ($1.9 million),
which is provided to MACS for downward lending to SHG members. The average cost of
funding for the federation is 11.5%, which is loaned to MACS at 17%, which in turn is
loaned to the SHG members at 21%.
5.4.4 Technology
Very little technology is used at ASP. At the SHG-level and mandal-level MACS,
transactions are recorded and tracked using the customary manual bookkeeping style.
However, uniform and consistent processes are followed across all SHGs and MACS. ASP
operates in 11 districts and there is one computer in each district. There are about 20
computers in ASP headquarters and 30 of the 55 staff at headquarters use computers
regularly to perform their daily duties.
The Excel-based Portfolio application and Tally accounting software are the two
primary applications used. Portfolio is used to track loans provided from ASP headquarters to
mandal-level MACS. It is granular enough to provide individual loan information. Excel
reporting capabilities are used to generate management reports. ASP is actively looking to
upgrade to a more sophisticated core banking solution and MIS system. However, ASP is
taking a wait-and-see approach to automating the field operations until a viable, cost-
effective solution emerges in the market.
CHAPTER
6
The Indian Microfinance Industry:
Trends and Challenges
6.1 Introduction
Microfinance providers in India have enjoyed significant growth during the past
decade, with the past three to five years witnessing even greater acceleration. However, as
discussed in Chapter 3, the demand for microfinance services far outweighs the supply,
which indicates that there is large growth potential for microfinance in India. In order to
capture this opportunity, however, the microfinance industry needs to overcome some major
challenges. This chapter explores the trends and challenges the MFIs are experiencing as they
seek to scale up microfinance services in India.
6.2 Trends
As the Indian microfinance industry matures and enters into a phase of high growth,
several trends can be observed. Trends in three areas are discussed below:
* Commercialization
* Operations
* Technology
6.2.1 Commercialization
According to a 2005 report by Sa-Dhan: "The MFIs that are operating in the form of
a company (NBFC/Section 25) are leading the growth. The MFIs that are in the form of a
society/trust are more in numbers but are much slower in their growth" This tremendous
business opportunity due to the gap between demand and supply is attracting entrepreneurs,
commercial investors, and professional managers to the microfinance industry. As a result,
the industry as a whole is becoming increasingly commercialized. Traditionally, the industry
has been operated largely by not-for-profit NGOs, and primary funding was provided by
multilateral and government institutions.
Some trends in commercialization, discussed below are:
* Increasing numbers of for-profit MFIs
* Commercial banks are offering funding
* Equity financing is beginning to appear
+ Number of For-Profit MFIs is Growing
Traditional MFIs, operated by NGOs, are hugely dependent on donor or grant money
from multilateral and government organizations and most of this type of funding is limited
and cannot be scaled. In order to begin filling the enormous unmet demand for microfinance
services, MFIs need to scale up their operations at an accelerated pace. As stated in Chapter
3.2, the current supply does not cover even 10% of total demand in India. But the growth of
the MFIs can happen only when they generate sustainable profits, thus helping to fund
additional investments but also helping to borrow money from capital markets for downward
lending. Hence, the larger, successful MFI organizations that registered initially as not-for-
profit trusts or societies are now transforming into for-profit non-bank finance companies
(NBFC). SKS is one such example, transforming itself from a non-profit society to an NBFC.
The for-profit nature of MFIs tends toward better governance, as they are subjected
to more stringent and transparent accounting practices as specified by RBI. This leads to
increased comfort levels among commercial banks that are considering lending to NBFCs.
At the same time, NBFCs also can raise external equity investment, which is
essential for MFIs to leverage and borrow debt for lending. SKS recently completed the
second round of equity investment of $11.5 million (Rs 506m), led by U.S.-based venture
capital firm Sequoia Capital.' SKS is planning to leverage this equity investment to raise
more debt to support its aggressive growth rate of more than 100%. This trend of equity
investments into for-profit MFIs is expected to continue as more and larger MFIs convert to
for-profit NBFC status.
In spite of the advantages of converting to NBFCs, many non-profit MFIs are not
able to make the conversion to NBFCs for two reasons:
1) NBFCs must have a minimum start-up capital of Rs 20m (or $465,000), which is
beyond the reach of most Indian MFIs.
2) NBFCs are subjected to very stringent requirements for raising savings, which is the
primary source of low-cost funding for smaller MFIs. Lack of savings places them at
a disadvantage of raising debt from commercial banks at higher interest rates.
To understand the distribution of MFIs with respect to their total loans outstanding,
only 27 of 117 MFIs (23%) reported data to Sa-Dhan in 2006, and they have total
outstanding loans of more than Rs 50m (-$1.19 million). Only 7 of 117 MFIs are
'<http://www.sksindia.com/07mar29.htm>.
incorporated as NBFCs, and one other MFI is incorporated as a local area bank (LAB),
which requires an even higher capitalization of Rs 50m. Smaller MFIs cannot convert to
NBFCs because of this capitalization requirement as well as the inability of NBFCs to raise
savings.
The MFI community in India has recommended the creation of an alternative new
class of financial institutions for smaller, for-profit MFIs, with a suggested lower
capitalization requirement of Rs 1 million (-$238,000).
Another important factor that would enable MFIs to convert to NBFCs would be to
provide the ability to raise savings, with certain safeguards (Mahajan, 2002). The savings
mobilized from their clients would help MFIs reduce their cost of funding; otherwise, the
only source would be to borrow bulk money from commercial banks at higher interest rates,
which ultimately results in higher interest rates to the end clients.
4 Commercial Banks are Increasing the Supply of Funds
Many commercial banks in India and abroad are increasingly participating in funding
microfinance activities in India, which has been traditionally supported by government
agencies such as NABARD. Almost all large India-based banks-ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank,
UTI Bank, Bank of India, Canara Bank, Andhra Bank, and many others-have actively
funded and continue to increase their portfolio of microfinance loans. Foreign banks, such as
Citibank, ABN-Amro, and Ing Vysya, have also significantly increased their funding to MFIs.
ICICI Bank: Partnership Model
ICICI Bank is by far the leading commercial bank providing finance to MFIs directly
or indirectly. ICICI developed an innovative partnership model with MFIs, in addition to its
active direct debt financing to MFIs. In this model, ICICI leverages the expertise of MFIs'
core competency of providing financial services in rural areas and uses the MFIs as agents or
service providers. Loans to end users are held on the ICICI books, and MFIs merely provide
services--conducting due diligence, issuing loans, and collecting repayments. MFIs are paid
fees for these services. ICICI has achieved great success in expanding its reach to the rural
poor by using this model, providing $227 million worth of loans to 1.2 million rural
households using this partnership model (Duflo, 2005).
4 Securitization
ICICI Bank was the first to use securitization of microfinance loan portfolios as a
means of providing financing to MFIs. ICICI Bank bought a portion of the microfinance
portfolio of SHARE Microfin Ltd, one of India's largest MFIs operating in southern India.
As part of the deal, ICICI bought the receivables of the existing loan portfolio, for which it
paid $4.9 million. Grameen Foundation USA provided a collateral deposit of $325,000. The
end result for SHARE was that the cost of funds was 4% lower than borrowing directly. In
addition, SHARE continues to service the loans it sold to ICICI and collect service fees-a
win-win situation for everyone. This arrangement not only provides additional finances for
new loans but also continues to gain revenue from existing loans.
On the global front, the $180 million, asset-backed securitization of the microfinance
loan portfolio of Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) was a major step
toward opening another avenue for MFIs to reach out to the global capital markets. The deal
was financed by Citibank, Netherlands Development Finance Company, and KfW
Entwicklungsbank.2 In another major international securitization deal, BlueOrchard Finance
and Morgan Stanley collaborated to provide $106 million of structured finance to 22 MFIs in
13 countries across Europe, Asia, and Latin America. 3
4 Equity Investment
Equity investment in MFIs is at a very nascent stage in India, although a number of
venture capital organizations focused on microfinance and the social sectors have appeared
recently. Some notable ones are: Bellwether Fund, Lok Capital, Aaviskhar, Intellecap, and
Grameen Capital. Bellwether Fund focuses exclusively on microfinance, raising $10 million
to make equity and debt investments in 11 MFIs. ACCION International, a major global
microfinance investor and promoter, began an India-focused fund in partnership with
Unitus.4
The most significant equity investment so far has been SKS's second-round
financing. SKS raised equity investment of $11 million lea by Sequoia Capital, making SKS
the largest venture-backed MFI in the world. As new MFIs start up quickly, existing MFIs
are scaling up their operations at an accelerated pace. There is a critical need to attract equity
investment and leverage it to raise debt and maintain capital adequacy norms. One issue
facing MFIs that try to raise equity investment is accurate valuation methods. Lack of clear
2 Micro Capital Monitor, July 11 2006, Issue# 1
3http://www.microcapital.org/cblog/index.php?/archives/285-BlueOrchard-Finance-and-Morgan-
Stanley-Partner-in-106-Million-Landmark-Financing-Deal-for-Microfmance-Investment.html#extended
4 http://www.accion.org/media_pressreleases detail.aspQNEWS E 21
exit strategies for MFIs also discourages typical venture capital investors, who want to cash
out within 5 tolO0 years.
By underwriting microfinance activities with new models of investment such as
those discussed in this section, commercial banks are expected to play a key role in providing
the much-needed funding for micro-credit in India.
6.2.2 Operations
As the microfinance industry grows at an accelerated pace in India, the scale factor
presents opportunities as well as challenges. MFIs are adopting professional management
principles and industry best practices in their operations, and they are increasingly leveraging
the latest technologies to improve their field operations as well as at the back offices.
4 MFIs operating efficiency is improving
As shown in Table 6.1 below, the Indian microfinance industry, in the aggregate,
achieved an operating self sufficient (OSS) measure close to 110.3% by the end of 2005 (Sa-
Dhan, 2006). A 100% OSS means the MFI is earning enough interest income to cover its
total costs-a combination of the cost of funds, cost of operations, and cost of loan losses (or
cost of risk). This is a positive indicator of the maturing the entire industry to near
sustainability, although the outreach is still relatively small.
Among the 74 MFIs it studied in 2005, Sa-Dhan reported that 14 had become OSS
and the rest were between 70%-99% OSS. This is an important trend among Indian MFIs,
especially the larger ones. It means they are becoming financially self sufficient and
generating profits that will enable allow them to expand their operations.
Table 6.1 Performance Measures of MFIs in India (2004-2006)
Fiscal Year Operational Self Operating Total Cost
Sufficiency (%) Cost Ratio Ratio
(%) (%)
FY 2004 72.8 20.0 34.9
FY 2005 110.32 15.43 24.9
FY 2006 104.64 15.43 23.39
Sa-Dhan recommended benchmarks > 100 < 20 < 30
Source: Sa-Dhan, 2006, adapted by the author.
In addition, the MFIs are improving their operating and financing costs, which are
reflected in improvements in two key ratios: Operating Cost Ratio (OCR) 5 and Total Cost
Ratio (TCR). OCR has improved 4.57% points from FY 2004 to FY 2005 and remained
constant in FY 2006. TCR has improved significantly, almost 10% points from FY 2004 to
FY 2005 and 1.51% points from FY 2005 to FY 2006, which indicates that performance
improvement achieved in FY 2006 is due mainly to low-cost financing from commercial
banks.
Due to the doorstep service of microfinance, operating costs are very high, and any
efficiencies gained in field operations have a great impact on overall MFI performance. MFIs
employ multiple strategies to contain costs and improve efficiency. Several key elements
drive these efficiencies and improved performance:
* Horizontal and Vertical Growth: The growth strategies of MFIs include horizontal and
vertical growth. Horizontal growth is achieved by growing geographically, while vertical
growth is achieved by offering multiple products to the same clients or increasing the size
5 Operating Cost Ratio = Total Operating Costs / Average Outstanding Portfolio.
6 Total Cost Ratio = Total Costs / Average Outstanding Portfolio.
of loans. The later strategy has the clear advantage of leveraging the same field staff for
multiple and higher-value transactions (e.g., credit, savings, insurance, remittances)
during the same visit to clients. Geographical expansion is usually done in contiguous
areas to minimize the cost of serving additional clients. Of course, adding more clients in
the existing geographical area has obvious operating efficiencies, and all MFIs seek new
clients in their existing coverage areas.
* Low-Cost and Longer-Term Financing: MFIs can access low-cost funding due to
increased competition among the commercial banks and an increased supply of funds.
Banks are lending at lower interest rates; and the larger MFIs can arrange longer-term
bulk loans that have a positive impact on their operating efficiency. Long-term financing
allows MFIs to spread the lending risks over a larger client base and offers more
diversified products and use of funds.
* Professional Management: Indian MFIs are attracting and recruiting management
professionals from business schools and the financial services industry. As the larger
MFIs transform into full-fledged financial institutions with operations in multiple states,
they require professional management in order to operate as a viable business. And as the
outstanding loan portfolio grows, the management of MFIs is driving systematic
improvements in loan asset portfolios, which in turn impacts operating efficiency. There
is evidence that MFIs are increasingly adopting a corporate organizational structure, and
titles such as Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Vice President of
Technology or Chief Technology Officer, and VP of Human Resources are becoming
more common. SKS recently organized its top-level management and added titles such as
Vice President of Finance, Vice President of Operations, and Vice President of
Technology (Akula, 2007). ASP recruited a 20-year financial services veteran from
Canara Bank to head its microfinance program. The CEO of ASP said that transforming
its microfinance operations into an NBFC is one of the primary goals, and that requires
professional managers from the financial services industry to make it happen Neelaiah,
2007).
6.2.3 Technology
4 Slow to Adopt
Technology adoption among the MFIs is relatively low, with even some of the
successful ones lagging behind. The smarter, more visionary MFIs have leveraged
technology to reduce operating costs in the field, improve management decision making, and
improve overall financial performance. Using MIS systems, some MFIs can accurately
estimate transactions costs for a specific financial product so they can better predict and
control the costs.
Some early technology adopters, such as SKS and BASIX, have pioneered the testing
and use of new technologies, such as smartcards, PDAs, and advanced communication
technologies beyond MIS systems. Costs and legal issues have prevented even these
advanced companies from deploying these solutions beyond the pilot stage. SKS believes
technology is a key component for rapidly scaling its operations and becoming more cost
effective. Several other MFIs, including ASP use computers and software applications such
as MS Excel to track their loan portfolio and management reporting.
It is estimated that only the largest 20 of more than 200 MFIs have some type of MIS,
but the trend is clearly on the upswing.
- Financial Information Network and Operations
The most important technology development for the Indian microfinance industry is
the launch of Financial Information Network and Operations (FINO). A collaboration
between IBM and I-flex, FINO was developed as a comprehensive, end-to-end solution for
automating field operations and core banking solutions. Their solution roadmap also includes
the development of a credit bureau in the future.
FINO was spun out of ICICI Bank as an independent company in June 2006, and it
owns 30%. The other equity investors include International Finance Corporation, NBARD,
Indian Bank, Corporation Bank, and Sovereign Global.
FINO leverages multi-function, personalized smartcards and biometric authentication
to automate field operations. Smartcards will eliminate the need for customer passbooks and
also serve as proof of identity. Other key banking solutions automate portfolio tracking and
traditional banking transactions, and include comprehensive management reporting
capabilities.
FINO has already conducted several pilots with MFIs, and it is in the initial stages of
production deployment. MFIs who have already signed up with FINO include KAS
Foundation, Spandana, and SEWA Bank. In addition, several banks have adopted this
solution. Cost is still a concern, even for large MFIs. Initial enrollment costs include the cost
of smartcards and enrollment fees for each member. MFIs also need to buy hand-held
devices for the field staff. The operating cost is charged as a percentage of transaction monies.
This solution is very comprehensive, but whether MFIs can utilize all the
functionality is questionable. In addition, the efficiency gains in field operations are also hard
to justify given that most smaller MFIs use simple products and repayment terms for an
entire group or village. Typically, MFIs use exception-based recording in the field, which is
quite efficient and less time-consuming.
However, by leveraging its strong relationships with Indian MFIs and its deep
knowledge of microfinance operations, FINO is well positioned to capture the rapidly
growing microfinance market. FINO has set aggressive targets for expanding its outreach,
targeting 2 million customers by the end of 2007, and 25 million customers within 5 years.
6.3 Challenges
There is ample evidence of tremendous growth possibilities for the Indian
microfinance industry. However, in order to realize this growth, MFIs and the industry as a
whole need to overcome significant challenges in the coming years. The following sections
discuss some of the challenges facing the industry and the ways it is trying to overcome these
challenges.
4 High Interest Rates
One of the primary challenges of the industry is high interest rates, which often
attract negative attention from politicians and public advocacy groups, and leads to
government intervention. The unfortunate suicide death of several MFI clients in Andhra
Pradesh in 2006 is a black mark on the entire industry. This incident caught the attention of
the national and international media, and eventually led to intervention by the state
government, which eventually set a ceiling on interest rates charged by MFIs.
In their defense, MFIs have to be financially sustainable in order to grow their
operations and reach the millions of poor people not yet served by the industry. Clearly, there
is a delicate balance between profitability and interest rates charged to end clients. For
example, SKS typically charges an effective rate of 24%, while ASP charges 21% to their
end customers. In comparison, traditional banks provide consumer loans to creditworthy
customers with interest rates in the range of 10-15%. This means poor people pay almost
double the interest paid by a creditworthy middle or upper-income customer. Consider,
however, that before MFIs started operating in their current form, the only source for loans
for the poor was a money lender who charged exorbitantly high interest rates ranging from
50% to 200%.
One of the main reasons MFIs have to charge higher interest rates is to cover the high
operating costs required to deliver microfinance services to the doors of their rural clients.
There are a large number of transactions, in very small amounts, which makes the cost of
each transaction very high as a percentage of the transaction amount. As noted earlier, it is
encouraging to see that overall industry efficiency is growing, and continued improvements
in the cost structure of the MFIs will have a positive impact on interest rates and ultimately
create a win-win situation for both the end clients and the MFIs.
4 Capacity Building
MFIs traditionally evolve from NGOs that were focused on social development. This
means that management comes from the social sector and possess limited skills in financial
services and business management. Typically they are trained in disciplines such as capacity
building, livelihood promotion, and raising donor or grant money from multilateral and
government organizations.
As the microfinance industry continues to grow rapidly and becomes more
commercialized, the industry will require professional managers and technical staff to
manage the MFIs as viable businesses. Microfinance has evolved into its own discipline and
it requires specialized skills-a combination of social development, financial services, and
business management, which is a rare combination of skills, and there are not enough people
in India who are professionally trained in such a diverse set of skills. It is estimated that
during the next four years the Indian microfinance industry will require 20,000 professionals
with expertise in accounting, financial control, risk management, business planning, financial
analysis, new product design, MIS, and social development.
Another major hurdle facing MFIs hoping to attract professional talent and business
school graduates is the perception that microfinance is still not a viable business and cannot
provide a professional work environment.
There are some ongoing developments toward filling the need for microfinance
professionals. The Washington-based Micro Finance Management Institute is collaborating
with the top business schools in India to develop courses and training materials for
microfinance management. ICICI Bank, in collaboration with the Center for Microfinance
and the recruitment consulting firm Mitra, has founded "MFI Careers," which will analyze
the requirements for microfinance jobs. They will also create awareness and promotion of the
microfinance industry with potential candidates and universities.
+ Commercial Finance
As discussed earlier, there is an increasing supply of capital from commercial banks
and other investors. However, there are still challenges for smaller MFIs and in some cases
larger MFIs, to access the capital needed to grow their operations.
4 Equity Capital
Equity capital is essential for leveraging debt financing and maintaining capital
adequacy norms. According to RBI regulations, NGOs, one of the main constituents of
financiers, are not allowed to make equity investments in MFIs. The microfinance
community in India continues to recommend changing this regulation to increase the amount
of available equity capital for MFIs.
According to Sa-Dhan estimates, Indian MFIs require an equity investment of Rs 1
billion ($23.8 million). ICICI Bank is one of the largest commercial financiers, and it is
currently working with 30 large MFIs in India that want to rapidly expand their MFI
relationships. ICICI provides bulk loans for lending and works with MFIs in a partnership
model. ICICI sees the lack of equity capital as one of the main constraints preventing them
from extending bulk loans to smaller MFIs7 .
The smaller MFIs are faced with issues such as lack of proper financial control,
internal governance mechanisms, and risk management, which are very important for
accurate valuation of the firms. Without proper valuation mechanisms, investors are not
inclined to make equity investments.
7 Center for Microfinance at Institute for Financial Management and Research, Microfinance in India -
Current Trends and Challenges, October 2006.
Another important consideration for equity investors is an exit strategy. The Indian
microfinance industry is just now taking off, and there are no incidents of MFIs being
acquired or issuing an IPO. Equity investors typically look to exit their venture investments
within 5 to 10 years, and having no forward-looking view of possible exit makes it harder for
them to take ownership in MFIs.
4 Limited Debt Financing Options
Debt financing is limited to mostly short-term bulk loans at market rates. Only
institutions such as SIDBI and NBARD provide long-term loans at rates better than the
market. An increasing number of commercial banks are showing interest, but only a handful
of large commercial banks in India are actually financing MFIs.
MFIs have not yet been able to access the public bond markets in India, which is
another important avenue for accessing funds.
Another option is to create structured finance deals with asset-backed securitization
of the loan portfolios similar to the deal undertaken by BRAC in Bangladesh. This means of
financing not only helps diversify the funding sources but also significantly lowers the cost
of capital.
4 Policies and Regulations
The government and Ministry of Finance have made many favorable policy changes
in the past two decades to promote microfinance activity in India. NABARD as an apex
government body for agriculture and rural development in India has done an exceptional job
of promoting the SHG-bank linkage program and is largely responsible for increasing
commercial bank lending to MFIs. However, government policies and regulations still
hamper the microfinance industry in India, and further policy changes will be needed to
promote growth. Other state and federal governments continue to provide subsidized loans,
which creates market distortions. Random and ad hoc debt relief by government agencies is
another impediment to developing a culture of repayment among the poor.
In the earlier chapters, we discussed the advantages for non-profit NGOs registered
as societies and trusts to convert to NBFCs. But there are several discouraging factors for
smaller MFIs that wish to make this conversion. First, is the minimum capital requirement of
Rs 20 million ($465,000), which is well beyond the reach of many smaller MFIs. In
Indonesia, by comparison, the minimum capital requirement for commercial MFIs is
$58,000-almost 10 times lower than what is required in India.
Another major limitation for NBFCs is the severe restrictions on mobilizing savings.
NBFCs can accept deposits only if they achieve an investment-grade rating from an
independent rating agency. Even a large profitable MFI like SKS made the decision to stop
accepting deposits when it converted to an NBFC. SKS now offers only micro credit and
insurance products. Inability to accept deposits denies the NBFCs an important source of
low-cost funds for lending, which could lower interest rates for the end clients. Introducing a
tiered regulation for NBFCs that includes different levels of minimum capital requirements
and easing the restrictions on mobilization of deposits, would allow a large number of NGO
MFIs to convert to for-profit entities.
CHAPTER
7
Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Summary of the Study
In this study, I reviewed the current state of microfinance in India. In addition, two
representative case studies were conducted as part of the research. The two studies were
chosen not only to represent the two differing schools of thought in microfinance (for-profit
commercial MFIs and not-for-profit NGOs) but also because they offer good examples of the
two dominant microfinance delivery models used in India--the Grameen model and the Self
Help Group model.
The study captures evolving legal structures, strategies, financing models, and
operating models used by Indian MFIs to rapidly grow their operations in order to fulfill the
huge unmet demand for microfinance. I also discussed the legal, financial, and technological
challenges facing MFIs, and I recommended remedial measures and policy changes required
to support the urgent need to expand microfinance services in India.
7.2 Conclusions
To summarize the findings of this study, the following conclusions can be drawn.
4 Microfinance has become a viable tool for alleviating poverty. With its enormous
population of poor people, India has attracted increased attention over the past decade,
although microfinance services were actually initiated by NGOs in India 30 years ago.
4 There is a huge gap between demand and supply for microfinance services in India. Less
than 10% of the total demand for micro credit is presently met.
4 During the last decade, the microfinance industry in India has evolved in many respects,
and it is now entering a new phase of rapid expansion. Some of the larger MFIs are
experiencing more than a 100% year-over-year growth.
4 SHG-bank linkages were pioneered and aggressively promoted by NABARD, which
was largely responsible for microfinance growth in the 1990s.
4 Commercial MFIs are leading microfinance growth in India. Larger MFIs run as NGOs
are converting to for-profit organizations in order to grow their operations and attract
investments from commercial banks and other institutional investors.
4 NBFC is the most common legal form adopted by for-profit MFIs. MFIs started as
societies and trusts, but after reaching a certain size they are now inclined to convert to
NBFCs.
4 The models most widely used by Indian MFIs are the self-help group model and the
Grameen model. Clients reached by MFIs using the Grameen model are growing at a
faster rate than those reached by MFIs using the SHG model. One reason is that the
Grameen model is preferred by commercial MFIs as it enables them to create smaller
groups more quickly. On the other hand, the SHG model requires considerable up-front
work and takes much longer to form a group and make it self sufficient.
MFIs in India offer three primary microfinance products: loans, savings, and insurance,
although a majority of MFIs focus on credit services. Most MFIs that adopted the SHG
model have a compulsory savings policy.
4 There has been a significant increase in the supply of capital for microfinance services
due to the strong entry of commercial banks. However, challenges still remain for
smaller MFIs that wish to access capital. While traditional lending from commercial
banks to MFIs continues to grow, alternative investments forms (e.g., equity, loan
purchases, and securitization) in MFIs are still in the early stages of development. There
are other innovative methods, such as ICICI Bank's partnership model, that increase the
funding available for microfinance.
MFIs are highly leveraged financial institutions, and equity investments in MFIs are
critical for leveraging and raising debt. NGO-run MFIs find it difficult to raise equity
capital.
The Indian government, Reserve Bank of India, and NABARD have made favorable
policy changes in the regulatory framework and helped promote microfinance during the
past decade. However, further policy changes are required in order to achieve the full
potential ofmicrofinance in India. NBFC regulations, including the minimum
capitalization requirement of Rs 20million, need to be changed as the current
capitalization requirement is too high for most MFIs, and it discourages them from
converting to an NBFC. NBFCs also have severe restrictions on accepting deposits,
which denies MFIs another less-expensive source of finance.
+ Interest rates have been declining, but the poor still pay a much higher rate than do
credit-worthy middle and upper-income people. The single biggest reason for higher
interest rates is the high operating costs involved in providing doorstep service when
delivering financial services to the poor. Many larger MFIs have achieved significant
reductions in their operating costs by making better use of best practices, technology,
and scale. Smaller MFIs continue to struggle with high operating costs. Technologies
such as smartcards, kiosks and digital cash, when available in a cost-effective format,
will have a significant impact on reducing the operating costs of MFIs.
There is general euphoria that microfinance has the potential to offer a solution for
India's massive poverty and to become a major industry serving people at the bottom of the
income pyramid. However, India is a large country with very diverse cultures, languages, and
religions, and varying levels of development in its many states and regions. The past
successes of microfinance have been limited to a few states that are relatively well developed
compared to the rest of the country. It is too early to predict whether microfinance will have
similar successes in other parts of the country.
Whether microfinance will become a major player depends on the outcomes of the
following questions:
* Will Indian MFIs ever scale up sufficiently to meet the huge demand for
microfinance?
* Will the global capital markets be willing to provide the huge capital required for the
Indian microfinance industry?
* Will the size of MFIs eventually make them more like traditional banks?
* Will MFIs continue to serve those who have finally moved beyond the need for
microfinance and can now access higher levels of money?
* Will commercial banks scale down to offer specialized financial services to the poor?
* Where is the fine line between MFIs and traditional banks?
* Will MFIs have the same success in less-developed states in the north and northeast
of India?
* As MFIs consciously moving toward commercialization and seek greater profit, will
they continue to preserve the core value of microfinance, which is alleviating poverty
and doing social good?
* Will MFIs run by NGOs continue their dual role of providing financial services as
well as livelihood promotion and capacity building?
* With their vast network and the trust they have engendered among the people, can
MFIs become a platform for delivering other non-financial services, such as
consumer goods?
Only time will tell - time, and the ongoing need of the poorest of the poor.
Appendix
Operational features of microfinance models in India
Operational SHG Model Grameen Model
Features
Clients Primarily women Primarily women
Targeting 'The poor' - broadly 'The poor' -
described as the specifically defined in
weaker sections or terms of income,
'BPL' housing, other assets,
type of employment
Groups 15 to 20 clients per Usually 5 clients per
group group (organized into
'centers' of 4-6 groups)
Service focus Savings and credit Credit - regular cycle
Some Savings
Meetings Monthly Weekly
Savings deposits Rs20-l 00/month Rs5-25/week
Interest on savings Bank rate (4.25%) 0-9%
+ profit share
Initial loan size Rs5-10,000 Rsl,000-10,000
Effective interest 24%-28% 28%-38%
rate (usual range)
Insurance At a very preliminary stage: usually loan linked
Sometimes linked to national companies
Development Some associated A few small social
services programs projects
Source: Akula, 2004. Adapted by the author.
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